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Punitive Damage Liability of
Municipal Corporations in

Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
The general rule in the United States is that a plaintiff has no
right to recover exemplary or punitive damages' from a municipal
corporation,2 or a state,3 in the absence of statutory authority.4
1. Synonyms for these terms are "punitory" or "presumptive" damages, "vindictive
damages," "smart-money," "added," or "imaginary" damages. H. OLECK, DAMAGES To PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 29, at 27 (1961). Closely related to punitive damages is the statutory
device of double or treble damages, used in nearly every state. This technique was first used in
England in 1278. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 518
(1957). Pennsylvania has numerous statutes authorizing such damages. See, e.g., 17 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.18a (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (double damages if employer should
deprive employee of employment because of absence on jury duty). While important differences exist between statutorily imposed multiple damages and common-law punitive damages,
see Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 101-02, 267 N.W.2d 595, 600-01
(1978), the rationale for insulating municipal corporations from punitive damage liability also
justifies prohibiting statutory multiple damages against municipal corporations.
2. The following cases hold that punitive damages cannot be imposed upon a municipal
corporation: Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Fisher v. City of
Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965), ajrg, 160 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Lauer v.
YMCA of Honolulu, 57 Haw. 390, 557 P.2d 1334 (1976); City of Gary v. Falcone,__ Ind. App.
- 348 N.E.2d 41 (1976); McHugh v. City of Wichita, I Kan. App. 2d 180, 563 P.2d 497
(1977); Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339 (Me. 1973); Desforge v. City of West
Saint Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950); Urban Renewal Agency of Aberdeen v.
Tackett, 255 So. 2d 904 (Miss. 1971); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo.
1968); Rascoe v. Town of Farmington, 62 N.M. 51, 304 P.2d 575 (1956); Brown v. Village of
Deming, 56 N.M. 202, 243 P.2d 609 (1952); Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla.
1976); Clarke v. City of Greer, 231 S.C. 327, 98 S.E.2d 751 (1957). See also 18 E. MCQUILLIN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.18a at 161 (3d ed. 1977); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d
903 (1951); notes 32-71 and accompanying text infra.
A "municipal corporation" is defined, in its historical and strict sense, as "the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and
authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns." I J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32 (5th ed. 1911) (quoted in Tranter
v. Allegheny County Auth., 316 Pa. 65, 81-82, 173 A. 289, 296 (1934)). Defined in this technical sense, the term "municipal corporation" includes only cities, boroughs, towns, parishes,
and villages. In this comment, however, the term is used in a broader sense that includes
public or quasi corporations, such as counties, townships, school districts and road districts,
which are created solely as instrumentalities of the state. See Egan Independent Consol.
School Dist. No. I of Moody County v. Minnehaha County, 65 S.D. 32, 35-36, 270 N.W. 527,
529 (1936); Phillips, Legal Position of Local Units of Government in Pennsylvania, 13 TEMP.
L.Q. 466, 481-87 (1939).
3. The following cases hold that punitive damages cannot be recovered from a state:
State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 579 P.2d 568 (1978); McCandless v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 391, 395,
166 N.Y.S.2d 272, 277 (Ct. Cl. 1956), modified and rev'd in part on other grounds, 3 App. Div.
2d 600, 162 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1957), a'd, 4 N.Y.2d 797, 149 N.E.2d 530, 173 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1958);
Drain v. Kosydar, 54 Ohio St. 2d 49, 374 N.E.2d 1253 (1978); Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 52 Ohio App. 2d 271, 369 N.E.2d 1056 (1976).
4. There is authority to the contrary. See Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp.

Courts have disagreed on whether Pennsylvania follows this majority rule. One federal court5 has interpreted Pennsylvania law as permitting the recovery of punitive damages from a municipal
corporation. A court of common pleas6 later declared this federal
decision to be in error, and held that Pennsylvania law prohibits
such damages against a municipality. The recently enacted Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act7 has further complicated analysis in
this area since it neither clearly permits nor prohibits a punitive
damage award against a municipal corporation in Pennsylvania.8 In
an effort to clarify this area of law in Pennsylvania, this comment
will analyze Pennsylvania law on municipal liability for punitive
damages and compare it to the law of other jurisdictions.
II.

Preliminary Considerations

A.

Municipal Tort Liability in Pennsylvania

The doctrine of governmental immunity,9 which applied to municipal and local governments, townships, and school districts, was
abolished in Pennsylvania in Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public
Education. ,o Prior to the 4yala decision a municipal corporation in
667, 682-83 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (applying Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969); Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.w.2d 612, 620-22 (Iowa
1978); Hayes v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 498, 503-07, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986, 991-95 (Ct. Cl. 1975), rev'don
other grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d 693, 376 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1044, 360
N.E.2d 959, 392 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1976). See notes 78-105 and accompanying text infra.
5. Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (E.D. Pa. 1967), at'd,400
F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969). See notes 136-47 and accompanying
text infra.
6. Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281 (Pa. C.P. 1975). See notes 148-56 and
accompanying text infra.
7. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.101
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80) was signed into law by the Governor on November 26, 1978.
8. See notes 157-74 and accompanying text infra.
9. The term "governmental immunity" refers only to that immunity applied to political
subdivisions or governmental entities other than the Commonwealth itself. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 587 n.2, 305 A.2d 877, 878 n.2 (1973). The term "sovereign immunity," on the other hand, refers only to the immunity of the Commonwealth.
Specter v. Commonwealth, 462 Pa. 474, 478, 341 A.2d 481, 482-83 (1975). Sovereign immunity
was abolished by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978), but was partially reinstated by the legislature. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
10. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), noted in, 25 MERCER L. REV. 969 (1974); 8 U.
RICH. L. REV. 372 (1974).
Rejecting arguments that (1) the abolition of governmental immunity would result in a
multiplicity of suits against municipalities with concomitant financial burdens; (2) that government functions would be curtailed as a result of tortious liability; and (3) that the doctrine of
stare decisis requires that the doctrine of governmental immunity be maintained, the Ayala
court advanced four reasons for removing governmental immunity. 453 Pa. at 595, 596, 603,
305 A.2d at 882-83, 886. First, a municipality can easily pass on the risk of liability to its
citizens. Id at 593, 305 A.2d at 881-82. Second, citizens who enjoy the fruits of the municipal
enterprise, must also accept its risks and attendant responsibilities. Id at 594, 305 A.2d at 882.
Third, cities are capable of inflicting great harm, and their civil liabilities should be viewed as

Pennsylvania enjoyed immunity from liability for tortious acts committed while acting in a governmental capacity. When acting in a
proprietary capacity, however, a municipal corporation was held liable for its torts in the same manner as a private corporation or an
individual." The proprietary-governmental capacity distinction was
not easily discernable, and was subject to substantial criticism.' 2
part of the normal and proper costs of public administration. Id at 594-95, 305 A.2d at 882.
Last, exposure of the government to liability for its torts will have the effect of increasing
governmental care and concern for the welfare of those who might be injured by its actions.
Id at 599, 305 A.2d at 884.
11. The governmental-proprietary standard is "a court-made distinction as to the types
of activities which governmental bodies perform, created to ameliorate the harshness of total
governmental immunity." Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 58, 284 N.E.2d 733, 735 (1972). In
jurisdictions that continue to recognize this distinction, a municipal government is viewed as a
composite of two functions, a private, proprietary function, and a public, governmental function as the arm or agent of the state. When a municipality is entrusted with public or governmental duties by the state, it is immune from tort liability arising from the execution of that
duty. A municipal corporation, however, is liable for torts committed in the performance of
municipal or corporate duties as distinguished from governmental duties. 18 E. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 2, §§ 53.23-.24 at 202-09. The rationale for this distinction is that when a municipality acts as an agent or representative of the state in performing governmental functions, it
shares the state's immunity, but it has no immunity when it acts for its own private or pecuniary benefit. James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
610, 623 (1955). Exactly what constitutes a proprietary function as opposed to a governmental
function has never been clearly enunciated by the courts or legislatures, and this failure to
establish a criteria has led to confusion in the application of the doctrine of governmental
immunity. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 25.01, at 468 (3d ed. 1972). Broadly
speaking, however, the two functions may be classified as follows: "activities of fire prevention, police, education, and general government are governmental; municipal railways, airports, gas, water, and light systems are proprietary; activities involving streets, sidewalks,
playgrounds, bridges, viaducts, and sewers are governmental in some jurisdictions and proprietary in others." Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV.
437, 442 (1941). For a discussion of the distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions in Pennsylvania, see generally J. VANDERZIEL, MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY (1967);
Phillips, Tort Liability of Quasi Corporationsin Pennsylvania, 32 TEMP. L.Q.1 (1958); Phillips,
Legal PositionofLocal Units ofGovernment in Pennsylvania, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 466 (1939); Schulz,
The Liability ofaMunicipal CorporationsforTorts in Pennsylvania,40 DICK. L. REV. 137 (1936);
Comment, Governmental Tort Immunity- Role ofCourts in Modifying Law, 7 DUQ. L. REV. 468
(1969); Comment, Governmental lmmuni from Tort Liability" Pennsylvania's Trend Toward
Abolition, 4 DuQ. L. REV. 441 (1966); Note, The Enigma ofMunicpal lmmunity, 65 DICK. L.
REV. 245 (1961); Note, Municipal Tort Liability in Pennsylvania-CheckeredImmunity, 100 U.
PA. L. REV. 92 (1951); Note, Tort Liability ofMunicipal Corporationsin Pennsylvania, 17 U.
PITT. L. REV. 674 (1956); 4 U. PITT. L. REV. 138 (1938).

12. Pennsylvania decisions showed marked disagreement on which functions were governmental or public and which were private or corporate, and functions held to be governmental in some cases were held to be corporate in others. Compare Shields v. Pittsburgh School
Dist., 408 Pa. 388, 184 A.2d 240 (1962) (operation of playground during vacation is a governmental function) with Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d
737 (1958), decided four years earlier (operation of summer recreation program is a proprietary function). See Mr. Justice Cohen's statement in the Morris case: "Perhaps there is no
issue known to the law which is surrounded by more confusion than the question whether a
given municipal operation is governmental or proprietary in nature." Id at 637, 144 A.2d at
739. See also Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 184-85, 301 A.2d 849,
851-52 (1973); Boorse v. Springfield Township, 377 Pa. 109, 113-35, 103 A.2d 708, 711-21
(1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). For criticism of the governmental-proprietary distinction,
see Barnett, The Foundationsofthe Distinction between Public and PrivateFunctions in Respect
to the Common-Law Tort Liability ofMunical Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REV. 250 (1937);
Doddridge, Distinctionbetween GovernmentalandProprietaryFunctions ofaMunicipal Corporations, 23 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1925); Seasongood, Municipal Corporations. Objections to the
Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936).

The Ayala decision rendered a municipal corporation in Pennsylvania liable for its negligence in the same manner as a private
person or corporation.' 3 A governmental body, therefore, became
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for injuries negligently caused by its agents, servants, and employees acting within
the scope of their employment. 4 The Pennsylvania legislature, reacting to the Ayala decision, has recently enacted the "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act" 15 that provides a comprehensive
procedure for the presentation of tort claims against political subdivisions' 6 and substantially limits the tort liability of municipal corporations in Pennsylvania. 7 It is not certain, however, whether this
act permits or prohibits a recovery of punitive damages from a municipal corporation."
B.

Punitive Damages in Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania adheres to the majority view that punitive damages are not intended to compensate the injured plaintiff, but rather
are imposed to both punish the defendant and deter him and others
from similar outrageous conduct.' 9 They are allowed for torts that
13. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); King v.
Sullivan, 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 318, 324 (C. P. Adams 1974). The removal of immunity, however,
does not render a municipality liable for all harm that results from its activities. It does not
impose absolute or strict liability upon a municipality. The abolition of immunity merely
"subjects it [the municipal corporation] to the same rules as private persons or corporations if a
duty has been violated and a tort has been committed." Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs of
Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 1978). Cf Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App.
22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973) (abrogation of doctrine of governmental immunity removes the defense of immunity, but does not create any new liability for a municipality). See also Hoffert
v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158 (1972); Short v. Khanka,
Inc., 69 Mun. 179 (Pa. C.P. Northam. 1975).
14. Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs. of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo.
1978). See also Devers v. City of Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 A. 540 (1932). Before a municipality can be liable for the torts of its officers, agents, or servants under the rule of respondeat
superior, there must exist (1)a relation of master and servant between the municipality and the
tortfeasor; (2) the act must be within the scope of the duties of the officer, agent, or servant; and
(3) the act cannot be ultra vires. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 2, § 53.65 at 293.
15. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.101 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had frequently appealed to the legislature to enact a comprehensive tort claims
statute. See, e.g., Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 186 n.3, 301 A.2d
849, 852 n.3 (1973); Supler v. North Franklin Township School Dist., 407 Pa. 657, 660, 182
A.2d 535, 537 (1962); Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 502-03, 162 A.2d 378, 381 (1960)
(Cohen, J., concurring); Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 635-36,
144 A.2d 737, 738 (1958).
16. The Act defines "political subdivision" as,
[any county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school district, vocational
school district, intermediate unit, municipal authority, home rule, optional plan or
optional charter municipality, any authority created by one or more political subdivisions, and any board, commission, committee, department, instrumentality, or entity
thereof designated to act in behalf of one or more political subdivisions.
53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.102 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
17. See notes 157-74 and accompanying text infra.
18. 1d
19. Hughes v. Babcock, 349 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa.
Super. Ct. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966). Pennsylvania has adopted the rule of punitive damages

are committed "wilfully, maliciously, or so carelessly as to indicate
wanton disregard of the rights of the party injured." 2 An act of
negligence is not in itself a sufficient basis for awarding punitive
damages. 2 Since punitive damages are not intended to compensate,
the plaintiff has no "right" to the award of punitive damages.2 2
In determining whether punitive damages should be given, "the
act itself together with all the circumstances including the motive of
the wrongdoers and the relations between the parties should be considered. ' 23 Evidence of the defendant's actual wealth is admissible
to determine the amount that would properly punish the defendant;24 nevertheless, punitive damages must bear a reasonable
rela25
tion to the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.
set forth in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1939). See McSparran v. Pennsylvania R.R.
Co., 258 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355
(1963); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970). Section 908 provides as
follows:
§ 908. Punitive Damages
(1) "Punitive damages" are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct.
(2) Where punitive damages are permissible, their allowance and amount are
within the discretion of the trier of fact. In assessing such damages, the trier of fact
can properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of
the harm to the plaintiff which the defendant caused or intended to cause, and the
wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1939). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1979); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, §§ 77-85 (1935). For

§ 908
a dis-

cussion of the history of punitive damages in England and the United States, see Belli, Punitive
Damages:-An HistoricalPerspective, 13 TRIAL No. 12, 40 (1977); Duffy, Punitive Damages: 4
Doctrine Which Should beAbolished in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4 (1969); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages. A Critical/naysis."Kink v.
Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369 (1965); Comment, The Imposition ofPunishment by Civil Courts.
A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158 (1966). For a history of their use
in Pennsylvania, see Note, Punitive Damagesfor Defamation in Pennsylvania, 4 U. PITT. L.
REV. 92 (1938).
20. Thompson v. Swank, 317 Pa. 158, 159, 176 A. 211 (1934). Accord, Phillip v. United
States Lines Co., 240 F. Supp. 992, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Cervi v. Mori, 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 355,
186 A. 261 (1936).
21. Medvecz v. Choi, 569 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Philadelphia Traction
Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. 37, 12 A. 816 (1888); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 2, at 10 (4th ed. 1971).
22. Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 276, 149 A.2d 648, 652 (1959); Comment, The Relationship of Punitive Damages and Compensatory Damages in Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L. REV. 585
(1971).
23. Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 345, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (1963).
24. Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Aland v. Pyle, 263 Pa. 254, 106 A. 349 (1919); Mathies v. Mazet, 164 Pa. 580, 30 A. 434 (1894);
Hannigan v. S. Klein's Dep't Store, I Pa. D. & C.3d 339 (C.P. Phila. 1976), aft'dper curiam,
244 Pa. Super. Ct. 597, 371 A.2d 872 (1976); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908, Comment e
(1939). See also Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Cf.
Johnson v. Smith, 64 Me. 553 (1875) (the defendant may also introduce, in mitigation of exemplary damages, evidence of his lack of means). See note 46 and accompanying text infra.
25. Givens v. W.J. Gilmore Drug Co., 337 Pa. 278, 10 A.2d 12 (1940); Golomb v. Korus,
Pa. Super. Ct. _, 396 A.2d 430 (1978); W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 2, at 14.
The courts are divided on whether an insurer may be held liable, under a liability policy,
for claims against the insured for punitive or exemplary damages. Most courts that hold an
insurance company not liable for punitive damages base their decision on public policy
grounds. The dual purpose of punitive damages-to punish and deter-would not be fulfilled
since insurance coverage would merely shift the punishment to the innocent premium payers

C

Punitive Damage Liability of Private Corporationsin
Pennsylvania

The federal courts and many state courts will not permit punitive damages against a corporation for misconduct of a servant or
agent unless the superior officers of the corporation order, participate
in, or ratify the outrageous misconduct of the agent or servant.26
This view is called the complicity rule.27 Pennsylvania follows the
less restrictive vicarious liability rule, which imposes punitive damages on a corporation whenever the agent or employee would be liable, regardless of whether the corporation authorized or ratified the
employee's or agent's act. 8 The leading Pennsylvania case on this
of the insurance company, and it would allow the guilty insured to escape the full burden of
punitive damages. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962);
Padavan v. Clemente, 43 App. Div. 2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1973); Esmond v. Liscio, 209
Pa. Super. Ct. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966). Those cases that permit insurance coverage of punitive damages hold that the public policy considerations against such coverage are outweighed
by the public policy that an insurance company that accepted a premium for covering liability
for punitive damages should honor its contractual obligation. Price v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d
341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). Moreover, most courts hold that no public policy against extending
insurance coverage to punitive damages exists when the insured's liability is based on respondeat superior, rather than on any personal wrongful act. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin.
Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934); Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ind.
1978); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Esmond v. Liscio,
209 Pa. Super. Ct. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343, 351 (1968). But see City
of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d 513 (1975) (even
though city's liability insurance policy provided coverage for damages arising out of torts committed by police in attempting to make an arrest or resisting attempted escape, public policy
precluded indemnification or defense by insurer of any claim for punitive damages). See also
Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 890-92 (1976); Zuger,
Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 53 N.D. L. REV. 239 (1976).
Pennsylvania's new Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act authorizes a municipal corporation "to purchase insurance on itself or its employees for any liability arising from the performance of their duties within the scope of their employment." 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5311.701 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (emphasis added). Cf. Royal Indem. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 1 Phila. C. R. 110 (Pa. C.P. 1977) (insurance company was required to indemnify the
city for punitive damages that were awarded against the city under an insurance policy in
which the city was the insured).
26. Lake Shore and Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Great Atd. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Lethcoe, 279 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1960); Griswold v. Hollywood Turf Club, 106 Cal.
App. 2d 578, 235 P.2d 656 (1951); Winkler v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 66 N.J. Super.
22, 168 A.2d 418 (1961); Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 909 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 217(c) (1958). See also 10 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4906 (rev. perm. ed.
1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979).
27. See Parris v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 395 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1968); Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Oakview New Lenox School Dist. v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 111. App. 3d 194, 378 N.E.2d 544 (1978). In addition to the federal courts,
fifteen states follow the complicity rule. 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 4906.
28. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1964); 5 U.
PITT. L. REV. 105, 107-09 (1939). For a general discussion of the relative merits of the complicity and vicarious liability rules, see 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 4906 at 502-03;
Comment, Liability of Employersfor Punitive Damages Resulting From Acts of Employees, 54
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 829 (1978); Note, Exemplary Damages Against Corporations, 30 GEO. L.J.
294 (1942); Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note I, at 526; Note, Recovery of Punitive Damages From CorporateDefendantsfor the TortiousActs of Employees, 10 LINCOLN L. REV. 207
(1977); Note, 4 U. PITr. L. REV. 92, supra note 19, at 100-01; Note, The Assessment of Punitive

subject explains this rule as follows: a "corporation is liable for exemplary damages for the act of its servant, done within the scope of
his authority, under circumstances which would give such [a] right to
the plaintiff as against the servant."29
The vicarious liability rule, however, can lead to unfair results
when applied in certain situations. Since the justification for the imposition of punitive damages is to punish and deter undesirable conduct, an assessment of these damages is difficult to defend when an
otherwise innocent principal is held liable solely on the basis of respondeat superior. 30 Recognizing the harshness of this rule, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has warned that "[t]oo great caution
cannot be exercised in permitting the recovery of punitive damages
for the willful or reckless act of a servant not authorized or approved
3
by the master." '
III.

Rationale for Insulating Municipal Corporations from
Punitive Damage Liability

To better understand the punitive damage liability of municipal
corporations in Pennsylvania, one must examine the rationales used
by courts in other jurisdictions for both denying and permitting recovery of punitive damages from a municipality. The majority of
jurisdictions that have chosen to insulate municipalities from liability for punitive damages32 have utilized the three following approaches to arrive at that conclusion: the functional approach, the
33
conceptual deductive approach, and the deferential approach.
Damages Against an Entrepreneurforthe MaliciousTorts of His Employees, 70 YALE L. J. 1296
(1961).
29. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519, 544, 6 A. 545, 553 (1886).
Accord, Seneca Falls Machine Co. v. McBeth, 246 F. Supp. 271, 279 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. 37, 12 A. 816 (1888); Gerlach v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co.,
94 Pa. Super. Ct. 121 (1928).
30. Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773, 356 N.E.2d 625,
626 (1976). See also Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 111. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509
(1975); W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 2 at 12.
31. Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 19, 70 A. 953, 954 (1908). See also Skeels v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1964) ("the conduct of the agent who inflicts the
injury complained of must be rather clearly outrageous to justify the vicarious imposition of
exemplary damages upon the principal").
32. Some jurisdictions have repudiated the doctrine of exemplary damages altogether.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 2 at 9 n.61. In these jurisdictions, of course, the recovery of
punitive damages will not be permitted against a municipal corporation. See, e.g., Skidmore v.
City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 244 P. 545 (1926); Longfellow v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 509,
136 P. 855 (1913).
33. The court in Ranells v. City of Cleveland, No. 30780, slip op. at 10-14 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 27, 1973), rev'd, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975), used these terms in its insightful
discussion of the issue of punitive damage liability of municipal corporations. Unfortunately,
this decision has not been reported; it is, however, discussed at length in 2 OHIo N. L. REV.
818, 820-21 (1975), and in 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 624, 633-36 (1976).

A.

FunctionalApproach

The approach most often utilized by the courts as a basis for the
denial of punitive damages is the functional approach. Courts using
this approach have analyzed the purposes behind punitive damages
and have examined whether these purposes are fulfilled in cases involving municipal tortfeasors. Their conclusion is that the purposes
of punitive damages are "to punish the offender and to deter others
from committing similar wrongs," 34 and that these purposes would
not be fulfilled in the case of a municipal defendant. They, therefore, refuse to permit punitive damages against a municipal corporation.3 5
1. Punitive PurposeNot Fulfilled.-Cases that follow the functional approach hold that an award of punitive damages against a
municipality would violate the basic punitive purpose behind the
award.36 A municipal corporation is composed of innocent, tax-paying citizens. 37 This group of tax-paying citizens is the same group
that is supposed to benefit from the public example set by the punishment of the wrongdoer. Imposition of punitive damages on a municipal corporation places the burden of paying those damages upon
the very group that the law seeks to protect through the addition of
the extra measure of punishment intended by the award of punitive
damages. 38 This results in an anomaly since the public sought to be
protected by deterring the wrongdoer is punished, though innocent
34. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965), aJ'g, 160 So. 2d 57 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
35. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 579 P.2d 568 (1978); Fisher v. City of Miami,
160 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), a#'d, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Foss v. Maine
Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339 (Me. 1973); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810
(Mo. 1968); Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952).
36. City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Constr. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 217, 424 P.2d 921, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1967); Lauer v. YMCA of Honolulu, 57 Haw. 390, 557 P.2d 1334 (1976); City of
Gary v. Falcone, _ Ind. App. -, 348 N.E.2d 41 (1976); Herilla v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 37 Md. App. 481, 378 A.2d 162 (1977); Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283
(Okla. 1976); Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975).
37. Citizens of a municipality are innocent because they are merely "passive wrongdoers."City of Lawton v. Johnstone, 123 Okla. 145, 252 P. 393 (1926). They have little control
over the agents of the municipality, as do stockholders of a private corporation. Moreover, a
municipal government is not always of their choice. See Costich v. City of Rochester, 68 App.
Div. 623, 631, 73 N.Y.S. 835, 841 (1902) (differences between a private corporation and a
municipal corporation justify awarding punitive damages in the case of the private corporation
but not in the case of the municipal corporation). See also George v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
374 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1978); Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65 Mo. 620, 62458 111. App. 3d 692, .___,
25 (1877). See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1204 (1931):
"Municipal corporations are not held liable for punitive damages for the torts of their servants.
This would seem justifiable. The money in the treasury is derived from the pockets of taxpayers who have comparatively little to say about the actual management of the corporation's
business." See also Judge Simon's emotional statement in McGray v. City of Lafayette, 12
Rob. 674, 677, 43 Am. Dec. 239, 241 (La. 1846): "[Punitive damages] can never be allowed
against the innocent. . . [and] cannot, in our opinion, be sanctioned by this court, as they are
to be borne by widows, orphans, aged men and women, and strangers .
38. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965), afl'g,160 So. 2d 57 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Accord, Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975).

of wrongdoing.3 9 Since it would be "absurd and illogical"4 to hold
that punishment should be imposed upon the public, courts have declared such a position contrary to public policy, 4 ' and have denied
recovery of punitive damages from a municipal corporation.
2. No Deterrent Effects.-Courts adopting the functional approach also declare that the deterrent purpose of punitive damages is
not fulfilled when punitive damages are awarded against a municipality. First, a huge award against a municipality will not necessarily deter other employees because even though a municipality may
seek indemnity against the wrongdoing employee,4" the employee
generally will not be able to pay a large punitive damage award that
is based upon the wealth of the municipality. 3 Second, municipal
employees will not exercise care when they know that the costs of
their negligence will be paid by their employer rather than from
their own financial resources." Third, a punitive award against a
39. City of Gary v. Falcone, __ Ind. App. -, _._,
348 N.E.2d 41, 42 (1976).
40. Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281, 287 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
41. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Wilson, 128 Miss. 726, 729, 91 So. 419, 420 (1922);
Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1976).
42. An employer, liable for the negligent acts of his employee solely because of the doctrine of respondeat superior, may seek indemnity against the negligent employee, since the
liability of the employee is regarded as primary. Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38
Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964); Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 326, 77 A.2d 368, 370
(1951); Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394, 396, 100 A. 124, 125 (1917); Muldowney v. Middleman, 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 75, 78, 107 A.2d 173, 175 (1954). See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY
§ 401, Comment c (1933): "Thus, a servant who, while acting within the scope of employment,
negligently injures a third person, although personally liable to such person, is also subject to
liability to the principal if the principal is thereby required to pay damages." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §401, Comment d (1958).
But see United States v.
Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954) (the United States is not entitled to indemnity from one of its
employees after it has been held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries negligently caused by the employee); Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5311.304(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (Pennsylvania municipal corporation is not entitled to indemnity from one of its employees after it has been held liable for injuries negligently
caused by the employee).
43. State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 67, 579 P.2d 568, 571 (1978); Fisher v. City of Miami,
172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965), ag'g, 160 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Another problem a municipality encounters in attempting to exercise its indemnification right occurs in
those situations when itis difficult to determine which employees are responsible for the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967), af'd,
400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (city was negligent for allowing
an accumulation of gaseous vapors in a sewer, causing an explosion that killed several workmen).
It is unlikely that the difficulty a municipal government experiences in seeking indemnification will deter it from hiring careless employees. As one writer has stated,
[T]here simply is no way to gauge whether a potential employee will become violent
when irritated, just as there is no method of determining with certainty whether he
will be a good worker. Certainly some investigation into his past employment should
be made, but if such investigation and a personal interview do not indicate a violent
or malicious tendency, should an innocent employer be further punished for an act of
his employee which he could not possibly have predicted? Has not the innocent employer suffered enough for his bad luck in hiring the tortfeasor by making full compensation to the injured party?
Duffy, supra note 19, at 13.
44. Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1977); City of Gary v.
Falcone,__ Ind. App. , , 348 N.E.2d 41, 42 (1976). See also Morris, supra note 37, at 1204.

municipality is not justified merely because of its possible deterrent
impact on other municipal corporations.4 5
Other means are available to deter willful and wanton conduct
on the part of a municipal officer. 6 The Supreme Court of Missouri
suggested the following method: "It is assumed that public officials
will do their duty, and if discipline of a wrongdoing municipal employee is indicated, appropriate measures are available through the
electorate . . . without recourse to punitive awards through the
courts." 47 A better method of deterring municipal employee wrongdoing is simply to have the punitive damage award assessed only
against the employee,4 8 based upon his own financial resources,
rather than holding the municipality liable for punitive damages,
and then forcing it to seek indemnification against the employee.
This approach not only punishes and deters employee misconduct,
45. See Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 361 (2d Cir. 1974) (court refused to
engage in speculation that a punitive award against the City of New York would be justified,
in whole or part, for its deterrent impact on other cities).
46. A compensatory damage award in itself will have a deterrent effect, because it causes
the defendant and other potential wrongdoers to realize that if they repeat their offense, they
will be forced to repair the harm done to the plaintiff. Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note
1, at 523. Compensatory damages alone, however, will not act as a deterrence in those torts,
such as conversion, which involve wrongful gains to the defendant, since compensatory damages will at most restore the wrongdoer to the status quo ante and may even leave him with a
profit. See, e.g., Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908), in which the defendant
willfully carried out blasting in such a way as to destroy the plaintiffs buildings "because it
was cheaper to pay damages . . . than to do the work in a different way." Id at 19, 70 A. at
954. See Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 1,at 522.
47. Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968). One criticism of the
Chappell approach is that it makes the erroneous assumption that the only municipal employees that are guilty of willful, wanton, or malicious conduct are elected officials. On the contrary, many malicious torts are committed by non-elected public employees who, because of
the civil service laws, could not be easily removed by the electorate. See also Morris, supra
note 37, at 1204: "It is not likely that the political employee will be punished when the power
of punishing him is in the hands of his political patron, because of the outcome of a damage
suit against the city. Assessment of punitive damages against a city would probably impoverish the public treasury without serving the admonitory function."
48. Many states have indemnity statutes requiring municipal corporations to provide for
the payment of judgments rendered against a municipal officer or employee for damages
caused by his negligence while engaged in the performance of his governmental duties and
within the scope of his employment. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-5 (Smith-Hurd
1962); 18A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16-6 (West 1968); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.304(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See also Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309, 226 N.E.2d 597
(1967); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 90 (1976). Most of these statutes, however, deny indemnification
for willful and wanton misconduct of public employees. Eifert v. Bush, 27 App. Div. 2d 950,
279 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1967), a]J'd,22 N.Y.2d 681, 238 N.E.2d 759, 291 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1968); 53
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.307 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See also Karas v. Snell, 11 111. 2d
233, 142 N.E.2d 46 (1957).
In Pennsylvania, some personal immunity for tortious conduct is granted to municipal
officials, Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958), however, they
are not immune from tort liability when proof of wanton and malicious conduct is shown.
Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151 (1865); Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862); Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa.
Super. Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 302
A.2d 491 (1973); DuBree v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 567, 303 A.2d 530 (1973),
vacated, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978); Walters v. Evans, 47 D. & C.2d 419 (C.P. Phila.
1969), ag'd, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 141, 279 A.2d 286 (1971). Accord, Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.307 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).

but also advances the public policy of judicial economy by reducing
the number of legal proceedings.4 9
3. PrejudicialEffect of the Wealth of a Municpa/ity.-Another
consideration discussed by those courts that follow the functional approach is the rule that permits admission of evidence of the wealth of
a tortfeasor to help determine the amount of punitive damages that
should be awarded." Evidence of the financial condition of the
tortfeasor is admissible since a relatively small damage award would
be adequate to punish a poor man, whereas a much greater sum
would be needed to punish a rich man.5' Many courts warn that if
this rule is applied to municipalities, it will permit evidence of their
unlimited taxing powers. This situation would have a twofold effect.
First, a jury would have difficulty in estimating the amount of punitive damages that would adequately punish and deter a governmental unit, 52 and second, evidence of the unlimited taxing power of a
municipality would have a prejudicial effect upon the jury.5 3 Several
courts have denied an award of punitive damages against a municipality for these reasons. 4
49. Many courts and commentators have argued that the availability of a punitive damage award against a municipal corporation is necessary to deter governmental infringement of
constitutional rights. Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 622 (Iowa 1978); Greenstone, LiabilityofPolice Officersfor Misuse of Their Weapons, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 397, 412
(1967). See McGray v. City of-Lafayette, 12 Rob. 674, 682, 43 Am. Dec. 239, 246 (La. 1846)
(Bullard, J., dissenting) ("it is mainly by means of fearless and independent juries awarding
exemplary damages, that the rights of the citizens can be adequately protected, and violence
and outrage suppressed"). It seems ironic that punitive damages, which originated in England
to deter the government from violating personal liberties, see Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep.
489 (1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763), are now generally prohibited against
the government in the United States. Cf. Rookes v. Barnard, I All E.R. 367 (1964) (England
abolished doctrine of punitive damages except when they could serve a useful purpose, by
penalizing oppressive, arbitrary, and unconstitutional action by government servants, or conduct calculated to make a profit for the actor). For a discussion of the damage remedies available against a municipality for violation of the federal civil rights acts, see Comment, New
Damage Remediesfor Violations of ConstitutionalRights, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 67 (1979); Comment, Municipal Liabilityfor Constitutional Violations. Can You Fight City Hall? A Survey of
the Circuits, 16 DUQ. L. REV. 373 (1977-78); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalitiesfor
ConstitutionalViolations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1976); Note, Municipal Law- Expanding Damage Remedies in FederalCourtsforMunicipalDeprivationof ConstitutionalRights, 30 OKLA. L.
REV. 944 (1977).
50. State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 67, 579 P.2d 568, 571 (1978); Fisher v. City of Miami,
172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965), afg, 160 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Nearly all states
permit admission of evidence concerning the wealth of the defendant as bearing upon the issue
of punitive damages. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 2 at 14 n.13; Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517,
supra note 1, at 528. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
51. State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 67, 579 P.2d 568, 571 (1978).
52.

City of Gary v. Falcone,

- Ind. App. -

, 348 N.E.2d 41, 42 (1976).

53. Fisher v. City of Miami, 160 So. 2d 57, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), a]t'd, 172 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1965) (Carroll, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 67, 579 P.2d 568, 571 (1978). In reality, the
taxing power of a municipality is not unlimited, for citizens will not tolerate unlimited tax
increases. Nonetheless, even if the taxing capacity of the municipality could be determined,
and a jury based punitive damages upon this amount, the award would still serve no punitive
purpose since the innocent taxpayers would still bear the burden of paying the award. See
notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.

One judge has criticized this rationale, suggesting that the law
provides adequate protection against an excessive punitive damage
award that is grounded upon evidence of the unlimited wealth of a
municipality.5 5 Punitive damage awards are subject to the rule that
exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relation to the amount
of compensatory damages, and they can be reduced by appropriate
action of the trial or appellate court.56 This argument, however, is
unpersuasive, for the rule that requires a relation between punitive
damages and actual damages has not prevented excessive punitive
awards. One leading authority has stated: "[Viery large awards of
punitive damages, ranging far out of all conceivable proportion to
the amount found by way of compensation, have been sustained. A
few courts have begun to repudiate outright the necessity of any ratio
or relation."5 7
B.

ConceptualDeductive Approach

A few courts have followed the "conceptual deductive" approach.5 8 These courts draw upon agency principles and argue that
a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for the malicious and
willful acts of its agent or servant, since such conduct is unauthorized
and beyond the scope of employment. Doyle v. City of Sandpoint5 9 is
illustrative of this approach. In denying the plaintiffs demand for
punitive damages against the City of Sandpoint for the alleged malicious acts of its officers, the court stated,
If the officers of the city acted maliciously and without probable
cause.

. .

the act would be that of the individuals and not of the

municipality. To act maliciously would be outside of the scope of
official duty and authority and would become the personal act of
the 6individual
for which he and not the city would be responsi0
ble.

Most of the cases utilizing the "conceptual deductive" approach
were decided in the late nineteenth century6' and are based upon
55. Fisher v. City of Miami, 160 So. 2d 57, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), aft'd, 172 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1965) (Carroll, J.,
dissenting).
56. Id See also Comment, 75 DICK. L. REV. 585, supra note 22.
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 2 at 14. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nulsen, 347 Mo. 1077,
152 S.W.2d 28 (1941) (libel; one dollar actual and $25,000 punitive); and Toomey v. Farley, 2
N.Y.2d 71, 138 N.E.2d 221, 156 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1956) (libel; six cents actual and $5,000 punitive).
58. City Council of Montgomery v. Gilmer & Taylor, 33 Ala. 116, 132, 70 Am. Dec. 562,
566 (1858); Doyle v. City of Sandpoint, 18 Idaho 654, 549, 112 P. 204, 206 (1910); McGary v.
City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 674, 43 Am. Dec. 239 (La. 1846).
59. 18 Idaho 654, 112 P. 204 (1910).
60. Id at 659, 112 P. at 206.
61. But see Drain v. Kosydar, 54 Ohio St. 2d 49, 374 N.E.2d 1253 (1978):
Where it is alleged that the acts of a state employee were motivated by actual malice,
or were acts which exhibited a wilful or wanton disregard for the health, safety and
welfare of the general public, the usual prerequisites for assessment of exemplary
damages, such conduct would certainly be outside the scope of state employment,
and liability therefor will not be imputed to the state.

outmoded agency law that held that a "principal is never liable for
the unauthorized, the wilful, or the malicious, act or trespass of his
agent."6 2 The modern rule is that an employee's tort is not outside
the scope of a private employer's business merely because it was

done with malice, and numerous cases have imposed liability upon
an employer for the malicious torts of his employee.63 This modern
rule is demonstrated in every decision that sanctions the recovery of
punitive damages from a private corporation.64 The "conceptual deductive" approach, therefore, should be disregarded by the courts as
a relic of the past.
C

DeferentialApproach

Courts following this approach oppose the award of punitive
damages against a municipality on the basis of precedent. These
courts suggest that legislative action is necessary to provide for punitive awards and that the judiciary should defer to the legislature and
not assume the responsibility of imposing punitive liability on municipalities.65 Urban Renewal Agency ofAberdeen v. Tackett6 6 illustrates this approach. In that case a property owner sued the Urban
Renewal Agency for willful trespass and destruction of certain ornamental trees. The court denied a request for punitive damages, stating that a "municipality is not liable for punitive damages because of
the acts of its servants or agents unless authorized by statute. No
such statute is cited, nor is one found by us. "67
This approach fails to consider the dim prospect of legislative
action in this area. Very few states have laws permitting punitive
damages against a municipality, 6 and it is unlikely that such laws
Id at 56, 374 N.E.2d at 1257. (citation omitted).
62. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 456, at 623 (4th ed. 1851).
Accord, Johnson v. Barber, 10 Ill. 425, 50 Am. Dec. 416 (1849); Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend.
343, 32 Am. Dec. 507 (N.Y. 1838).
63. 2 F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 1926, 1957-1972, at 1497,
1520-30 (1914); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 89, at 155 (1964); F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 38, at 109 (2d ed. 1924).
64. See notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra.
65. Scott v. Abilene Independent School Dist., 438 F. Supp. 594, 599 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
Bennett v. City of Marion, 102 Iowa 425, 71 N.W. 360 (1897), o'erruledby, Young v. City of
Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978); McHugh v. City of Wichita, 1 Kan. App. 2d 180,
563 P.2d 497 (1977); Desforge v. City of West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950);
Town of Newton v. Wilson, 128 Miss. 726, 91 So. 419 (1922); Fisher v. Kansas City, 518
S.W.2d 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Rascoe v. Town of Farmington, 62 N.M. 51, 304 P.2d 575
(1956); Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952). See also Clarke v. City
of Greer, 231 S.C. 327, 98 S.E.2d 751 (1957); Lineberger v. City of Greenville, 178 S.C. 47, 182
S.E. 101 (1935); Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Cole v.
City of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
66. 255 So. 2d 904 (Miss. 1971).
67. Id at 905 (citation omitted).
68. Some courts, however, have awarded punitive damages against a municipality based
upon statutory authority. See, e.g., Coffee County v. Parrish, 249 Ala. 226, 30 So. 2d 578
(1947); Myers v. City of San Francisco, 42 Cal. 215 (1871); City of Minneapolis v. Richardson,
307 Minn. 80, 239 N.W.2d 197 (1976); Earle v. Greenville County, 215 S.C. 539, 56 S.E.2d 348

will be enacted in the near future. Many municipalities are currently
in the midst of a fiscal crisis,6 9 and the general sentiment of the public is against increased government spending.7" State legislatures
will not readily permit the recovery of punitive damages from a municipal corporation in these circumstances." Any expansion of punitive damages against a municipality will probably have to be
accomplished by the judiciary. While the better rule would prohibit
such damages against a municipality, the courts, nonetheless, should
not avoid this question by deferring to the legislature. They should
deal with the issue directly, and should justify their refusal to grant
punitive damages on explicit grounds of public policy. This approach indeed might cause the legislature to act upon this question,
if it found itself in disagreement with the determination of the judiciary.
In conclusion, while the functional, conceptual deductive, and
deferential approaches all reach the same result, the latter two approaches offer inadequate justifications for their conclusions. The
functional approach, however, is the better rationale because it offers
the best arguments for denying punitive damages against a municipality. Therefore, this approach should be adopted by all courts.
IV.

Cases in Which The Facts Do Not Require the Court to
Address the Legal Issue

Not every case involving claims for punitive damages against
municipal corporations requires a court to decide whether punitive
damages may be imposed upon a municipality. A court may be able
to deny punitive damages because the facts fail to disclose willful(1949). Cf. State Dep't of Corrections v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 3d
885, 489 P.2d 818, 97 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971) (statute authorized damage award to be increased
by one-half); Michaud v. City of Bangor, 160 Me. 285, 203 A.2d 687 (1964) (double and treble
damages); Govemale v. City of Owosso, 59 Mich. App. 756, 229 N.W.2d 918 (1975) (treble
damages).
Other courts, however, have interpreted their statutes as prohibiting punitive damages
against a municipality. Dawkins v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. App. 3d 720, 136 Cal. Rptr.
882 (1977); Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460 (1881); Newell v. City of Elgin, 34 Ill.
App. 3d 719, 340 N.E.2d 344 (1976); McManus v. City of Madison Heights, 366 Mich. 26, 113
N.W.2d 889 (1962); Herrmann v. Fossum, _ Minn. __ 270 N.W.2d 18 (1978); Desforge v.
City of West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950); Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65
Miss. 620 (1877); Woodman v. Town of Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387 (1870). Cf. University of
Alas. v. Hendrickson, 552 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1976) (statute prohibited punitive damages against
state).
69. See Zelinsky, The Cities and the Middle Class. Another Look at the Urban Crisis,
1975 Wis. L. REV. 1081.
70. See, e.g., California's Tax Revolt, TIME, June 5, 1978.
71. One reason that the prospects for legislative action on tort claims against governmental entities are "impaired" is because the citizens injured by governmental torts "are dispersed
and not of such an identifiable group that they might be mobilized into a collective voice so as
to alert the legislature of their grievance." 25 MERCER L. REV. 969, 979 (1974). Moreover, any
legislation would probably "not be retroactive, therefore, providing no incentive for the victims of past governmental torts to form pressure groups." Id

ness, malice, outrageous conduct, or gross negligence. When these
factual elements are not present, courts do not address the legal issue
of whether a defendant's status as a public corporation should bar a
plaintiff's recovery of punitive damages.72 This approach is consistent with the judicial policy of deciding a case on the most narrow
ground possible.73
An example of this type of case is Gigler v. City of Klamath
Falls.7 4 In Gigler, plaintiff was ordered removed from a city council
meeting by the mayor. The plaintiff brought an action against the
city, the mayor, and two police officers for assault and battery, false
arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and outrageous
conduct. The court held that the removal of plaintiff from the meeting was not conduct so outrageous that he should be entitled to punitive damages.7 5 Since the court remained silent on the question of
the effect of defendant's status as a municipal corporation on punitive damages, Gigler and similar cases cannot be considered as implicitly authorizing the assessment of exemplary damages against a
municipal corporation,76 as has been suggested by some authorities.77
V. View Permitting Punitive Damages Against a Municipality
Notwithstanding the majority view, several courts have authorized punitive damages against municipal corporations.7 8 First, some
courts that subscribe to the general rule prohibiting punitive damages against a municipality will allow an exception to this rule when
72. City of Covington v. Faulhaber, 177 Ky. 623, 197 S.W. 1065 (1917); Gigler v. City of
Klamath Falls, 21 Or. App. 753, 537 P.2d 121 (1975); Armstrong & Latta v. City of Philadelphia, 249 Pa. 39, 94 A. 455 (1915); Spencer v. Carlisle Borough, 63 Pa. Super. Ct. 513 (1916);
City of Katy v. Waterbury, 581 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Moody v. City of
Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See notes 122-29 and accompanying
text infra.
73. Cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (Court will not address a constitutional question presented by the record, if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground).
74. 21 Or. App. 753, 537 P.2d 121 (1975).
75. Id at 764, 537 P.3d at 126.
76. Accord, Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281, 284-85 (Pa. C.P. 1975); Annot.,
19 A.L.R.2d 903, 907 (1951).
77. Some authorities incorrectly presume that the courts in these cases would have permitted an assessment of punitive damages against the municipal defendant had the requisite
conduct for punitive damages been present. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F.
Supp. 667, 683 (E.D. Pa. 1967), af'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904
(1969); Note, Punitive Damage Liability of Municipal Corporations,22 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
126, 130-31 (1965) (both interpreting Armstrong & Latta v. City of Philadelphia, 249 Pa. 39, 94
A. 455 (1915), as impliedly permitting a punitive damage award against a municipal corporation). See also notes 122-29 and accompanying text firMa.
78. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The State of Michigan regards punitive
damages as extra compensation for injured feelings or sense of outrage, rather than for punishment. See Wise v. Daniel, 222 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922). Michigan courts, therefore,
have held that punitive damages are permitted against a municipal corporation. Ray v. City of
Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 242 N.W.2d 494 (1976).

there are extraordinary circumstances7 9 or when either the citizens or
superior officers of the municipality authorize or ratify the tortious
conduct of an agent or employee of the municipality.8" Second, a
few courts, finding the rationale of the majority view unconvincing,
81
have expressly allowed punitive damages against a municipality.
A.

Exceptions to the Majority Rule that Insulates Municipalities
from Punitive Damage Liability

1. Extraordinary Circumstances Doctrine.-Some courts will
82
permit punitive damages if "extraordinary circumstances" arise.
In Smith v. District of Columbia,83 the appellant recovered a verdict
of $7,000 for compensatory damages arising from a false arrest and
assault. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected his contention that the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury the
question of the District's liability for punitive damages. The court
stated that "[aibsent extraordinary circumstances not present here,
we agree with the weight of authority and conclude the District of
Columbia is not liable for punitive damages." 84 The court, however, did not explain what circumstances would be sufficiently "extraordinary" to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.85
In holding a municipal corporation not liable for punitive damages absent extraordinary circumstances, courts such as the Smith
court seem to have adopted an ad hoc approach that permits an
award of punitive damages against a municipality whenever the
court deems the award necessary. Thus, even if a municipality's
conduct is willful, malicious, or outrageous according to traditional
punitive damage standards,86 it is, nevertheless, immune from exemplary damages if the court does not perceive the requisite extraordinary circumstances. On the other hand, the same court could
possibly view conduct that does not satisfy the traditional test of punitive damages as an extraordinary circumstance, which would
79. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text infra.
80. See notes 88-95 and accompanying text infra.
81. See notes 96-105 and accompanying text infra.
82. Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Smith v. District of
Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Costich v. City of Rochester, 68 App. Div. 623, 626, 73
N.Y.S. 835, 837 (1902); Ostrom v. City of San Antonio, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 683, 77 S.W. 829
(1903). See also City of Chicago v. Martin, 49 111. 241,246, 95 Am. Dec. 590, 594 (1868) ("It is
scarcely conceivable that a case could be made against a municipal corporation, justifying
punitive damages").
83. 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975).
84. ld at 832.
85. One federal court recently considered the Smith case, but found it unnecessary to
"determine the outlines of the 'extraordinary circumstances' that might permit a punitive damages award against the District of Columbia." Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462,
482 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
86. See notes 19-31 and accompanying text supra.

render the municipal corporation liable for punitive damages.8 7 In
certain cases, therefore, the extraordinary circumstances doctrine
may be a less stringent test than the traditional punitive damage test.
This doctrine will remain an enigmatic one, however, until courts are
presented with opportunities to explain what is meant by "extraordinary circumstances."
2. Ratification or Authorization by Citizens or Superior Officers
of the Municpality.-Several courts that bar exemplary damages
against a municipality will allow such damages when the citizenry
has authorized or ratified the wrongful acts committed by the agents
of the municipality.8 8 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma is among
the courts that have adopted this approach, holding that "a municipality may not be held liable for exemplary damages without adequate evidence to demonstrate that the citizenry of the municipality
had acquiesced in the wrongful conduct to the point that reasonable
men would agree that the citizens had condoned or approved the
wrongful conduct." 89 The court adopted this rule in an effort "to
shield the taxpaying public from the economic burden of damages
unrelated to any injury actually sustained by the plaintiff, and yet
leave open the possibility of recovery in the most flagrant cases." 90
New York courts utilize a similar approach, and hold that
before a punitive damage award will be permitted against a municipality, the superior officials of the municipality must have ratified or
authorized the tortious conduct. 9 ' This view is analogous to the
87. The extraordinary circumstances doctrine could also be merely another way of expressing the traditional punitive damage standard, so that an extraordinary circumstance
would occur any time a defendant acted willfully, wantonly, maliciously, or recklessly.
88. Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1976); City of Lawton v. Johnstone,
123 Okla. 145, 252 P. 393 (1926); San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Brothers, 528 S.W.2d 266
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Willett v. Village of St. Albans, 69 Vt. 330, 38 A. 72 (1897); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 412, at 1349-50 (1916).

See also Peace v.

City of Center, 372 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1967).
89. Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Okla. 1976).
90. Id
91. Lochhaas v. State, 64 App. Div. 2d 816, 407 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1978).
New York courts are currently in a state of confusion on the question of municipal liability for punitive damages. Many courts have expressed uncertainty on the state of the law in
New York. Kieninger v. City of New York, 53 App. Div. 2d 602, 384 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1976);
Chirieleison v. City of New York, 49 App. Div. 2d 873, 373 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1975); Eifert v.
Bush, 27 App. Div. 2d 950, 279 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1967), af]'d 22 N.Y.2d 681, 238 N.E.2d 759, 291
N.Y.S.2d 372 (1967); Snyder v. State, 20 App. Div. 2d 827, 247 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1964). The
majority of courts hold that the superior officials of the municipality must ratify or authorize
the tortious conduct of the agent or employee before a municipality will be liable for punitive
damages. Bevilacqua v. City of Niagara Falls, 66 App. Div. 2d 988, 411 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1978);
Lochhaas v. State, 64 App. Div. 2d 816, 407 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1978); Mastrodonato v. Town of
Chili, 39 App. Div. 2d 824, 333 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1972); Costich v. City of Rochester, 68 App. Div.
623, 73 N.Y.S. 835 (1902); Nephew v. State, 178 Misc. 824, 36 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Ct. Cl. 1942).
Some New York courts allow punitive damages against a municipality without a showing of
ratification or authorization. Hayes v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 498, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Ct. Cl. 1975),
rev'don other grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d 693, 376 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1975), af'd,40 N.Y.2d 1044,
360 N.E.2d 959, 392 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1976); Macord v. City of New Rochelle, 179 Misc. 311, 39

"complicity rule" applicable to private corporations.92 This approach places a heavy burden of proof upon a plaintiff seeking to
implicate a municipality in its employee's acts since evidence of authorization or ratification is almost always within the exclusive control of the municipal corporation. 93 It is not surprising, therefore,
that only one reported case has held a municipality liable for punitive damages on the grounds that it ratified or authorized the malicious tort of its agent.94 In St. Johns Gas Co. v. City of San
Juan,95exemplary damages were permitted against the city when the
mayor took unlawful possession of private property. The city retained control of the property for an extended period of time, and
the court decided that this was sufficient ratification to hold the city
liable for punitive damages.
B.

Courts Expressly PermittingPunitive Damages Against a
Municipal Corporation

A few recent decisions, stating a dissatisfaction with the rationale offered by a majority of courts, have expressly allowed punitive
damages against a municipality. 96 In Young v. City of Des Moines9 7
a jury returned a verdict against the City of Des Moines in an action
for false arrest. The trial court, however, held as a matter of law that
punitive damages were not recoverable from a municipality. On appeal, a majority of the Iowa Supreme Court disagreed and concluded "that under proper circumstances punitive damages are
recoverable in tort claim actions against governmental subdivisions." 98 The court declared that the amount of exemplary damages
must be left to the sound judgment of a jury, subject to judicial review, and that any question regarding the recovery of punitive damages from a municipal corporation must be determined by applying
the same legal principles as in actions against private corporations.99
The court discussed the public policy considerations that the
N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (treble damages). See also Williams v. City of New York, 508
F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1974); 40 N.Y. JURIS., Municipal Corporations,§ 979 at 227 (1965).
92. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
93. See Comment, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 829, supra note 28, at 846.
94. St. Johns Gas Co. v. City of San Juan, 1 P. R. Fed. 160 (1902).
95. Id
96. Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978); Hayes v. State, 80 Misc.
2d 498, 503-07, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986, 991-95 (Ct. Cl. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 50 App. Div.
2d 693, 376 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1975), afid, 40 N.Y.2d 1044, 360 N.E.2d 959, 392 N.Y.S.2d 282
(1976). See also Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affd,
400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 904 (1969); City of Miami v. McCorkle, 145
Fla. 109, 199 So. 575 (1940); Kelly v. Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935),
overruledby, Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968); Whipple v. Walpole,
10 N.H. 130 (1839).
97. 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978).
98. Id. at 622.
99. Id See notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra.

majority of courts have accepted as barring a punitive damage
award against a municipality.' °" It did not find the majority view
persuasive,' 0 1 however, stating that "[v]irtually the same objections
have been made and rejected as to private corporations."' 0 2 The
court posited two additional reasons for permitting punitive damages
against the City of Des Moines. First, such an award "will further
deter unfounded and oppressive peace officer conduct under the
guise of official action,"'0 3 and will cause municipalities to be more
careful in the selection and training of its agents and employees. 104
Second, the court interpreted the state's Governmental Subdivision
Tort Claims Act as permitting a recovery of punitive damages from a
municipality. "'
The Young court, however, did not attempt to analyze and criticize the public policy considerations that justify prohibiting a punitive damage recovery from a municipality. Had it done so, the
Young case might have caused other courts to reexamine their decisions insulating a municipality from punitive damage liability. By
failing to show error in the rationale used by the majority of courts,
and by partially basing its decision on a statute permitting a punitive
award against a municipality, the Young opinion has not discredited
the soundness of the policy reasons supporting the majority view
that, in the absence of statutory authority, punitive damages are not
recoverable from a municipal corporation.
VI.

The Pennsylvania Problem

Pennsylvania law is currently clouded on the question of
whether a municipal corporation can be liable for punitive damages.
Federal'0 6 and state 0 7 courts, both interpreting Pennsylvania law,
100. See notes 34-57 and accompanying text supra.
101. Nearly all the commentators have also found the majority view unpersuasive, and
have advocated awarding punitive damages against a municipality. Most stress the deterrent
effect of such an award and argue that since private corporations are liable for punitive damages, a municipal corporation should also be liable for these damages. 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 11.204, at 245 (1979); Greenstone, supra note 49, at 412; Hines,
MunicipalLiabilityfor Exemplary Damages, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 304, 310-12 (1966); Van
Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability" .4 Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 976; Note,
Municipal Corporations.-Liabilityfor Intentional Torts and Punitive Damages, 18 U. FLA. L.
REV. 173, 176-77 (1965); Note, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 126, supra note 77, at 131-32; 2 OHIO

N. L. REV. 818, 827 (1975); 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 624, 642 (1976). See also Fisher v. City of
Miami, 160 So. 2d 57, 60-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), af'd, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965) (Carroll, J., dissenting); McGary v. City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 674, 678-82, 43 Am. Dec. 239, 242-46
(La. 1846) (Bullard, J., dissenting); Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 9-10, 321
N.E.2d 885, 889-90 (1975) (Brown, J., dissenting).
102. 262 N.W.2d at 621.
103. Id at 622.
104. Id
105. Id at 620, 622; IowA CODE ANN. § 613A (West Supp. 1979-80).
106. Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affid, 400
F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969).
107. Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281 (Pa. C.P. 1975).

have reached different conclusions concerning this question. The
Pennsylvania legislature has further complicated this problem by recently enacting a municipal tort claims act that neither clearly permits nor prohibits a punitive damage award against a municipal
corporation in Pennsylvania." °8 Although respectable authority exists both supporting and opposing the imposition of punitive damages, 10 9 the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law is that
exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable from a municipal corporation.
4.

The Hermits of St. Augustine Case.- Punitive DamagesAre Not
Recoverablefrom a Municpality

Order of Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of Philadelphia,"0
an 1847 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, was the first Pennsylvania case in which a court considered the question of municipal
tort liability for punitive damages. The court, sitting at nisi prius, "'
held that punitive damages could not be awarded against a municipal corporation. Plaintiff sought damages under a Philadelphia mob
violence law for property destroyed in a riot. The statute imposed
liability upon the County of Philadelphia for property destroyed
within the county by a riot or violence.I" After a recital of the facts,
Mr. Justice Rogers gave the following jury instruction on punitive
damages:
[T]he only question is as to the amount of the damages ....
If lawless individuals are made to understand that the result of
their violence will recoil upon themselves, they will pause in their
career. .

.

. If this action were against the rioters and not against

the county, I would instruct you to give exemplary damages; these,
however, you cannot give against the county, but damages to the
full extent of the injury you should give. .

. In a case like this

against the county, I have said exemplary or vindictive damages
cannot be given.'
108. See notes 157-74 and accompanying text infra.
109. See notes 110-56 and accompanying text infra.
110. 4 Clark 120, 7 Pa. L.J. 124 (1847).
111. By § 2 of the Act of June 16, 1836, entitled "An act Relative to the jurisdiction and
powers of the Courts," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was given original jurisdiction
within the City and County of Philadelphia in all civil actions when the matter in controversy
was over five hundred dollars. 1836 Pa. Laws 784. When exercising its original jurisdiction,
the supreme court acted as a nisi prius court, which was held for the trial of issues of fact
before a jury and one presiding justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Surrency, The
Development of the Appellate Function.- The Pennsylvania Experience, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
173, 181-87 (1976). The supreme court, sitting as an appellate court, could review a determination of one of its judges sitting at nisi prius. Id at 184. The supreme court's nisi prius jurisdiction was abolished in 1874. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. 5, § 21. See Deer Creek Drainage Basin
Auth. v. Allegheny County Bd. of Elections, 475 Pa. 491, 507 n.7, 381 A.2d 103, 111 n.7 (1977);
2 F. EASTMAN, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF PENNSYLVANIA: A HISTORY, 1623-1923, at 430, 529
(1922).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11821 (Purdon 1956) (repealed 1970).
113. 4 Clark at 123, 7 Pa. L.J. at 126.

The court concluded that interest on the property from the time of its
destruction to the time of trial could be awarded as part of compensatory damages, but should not be regarded as "vindictive damages."' 14
The Hermits of St. Augustine case, decided more than a century
ago, maintains its precedential value on the issue of municipal tort
liability for punitive damages. It is an emphatic statement by the
highest court in the state that "any damages awarded against a municipal corporation must be compensatory and cannot be punitive.""' 5 Since the Hermits of St. Augustine decision was at nisi
prius, however, it cannot be given as much precedential weight as a
decision of the supreme court sitting as an appellate court. 16 Nonetheless, the decision is entitled to greater respect than other trial
courts of the Commonwealth because it was written by a justice of
the highest tribunal in the state.' ' The Hermits of St. Augustine
case, therefore, should be followed by Pennsylvania courts in the absence of other precedents.
B. Later State Court Decisions on a Municqality's Punitive
Damage Liability
I Howell v. Borough of West Chester.- Punitive Damages Impliedly Allowed.--One state court decision, which did not cite Hermits of St. Augustine, impliedly held that under Pennsylvania law a
municipal corporation could be liable for punitive damages. In
Howell v. Borough of West Chester,' 8 the issue of municipal liability
for punitive damages arose in a motion for a new trial. The jury had
returned a verdict for plaintiff in a nuisance action against defendant
borough for polluting a stream running through the plaintiff's property. The defendant moved for a new trial, contending that the court
erred in submitting a punitive damages instruction to the jury." 19
The court denied the motion, deciding that no error had been committed. Although the Howell case impliedly permitted a punitive
damage award against a municipal corporation, the decision has lit114. Id at 124, 7 Pa. L.J. at 127.
115. Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281, 286 (Pa. C.P. 1975). See also Annot., 19
A.L.R.2d 903, 908, 913 (1951) (cites Hermits of St. Augustine case as controlling decision on
punitive damages against a municipality).
116. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS § 40, at 112 (1912).
See also note I I and accompanying text supra.
117. Surrency, supra note I 11,at 183.
118. 26 Lanc. 201 (Pa. C.P. 1909).
119. The court charged the jury as follows:
Then as I have said the plaintiff is entitled in addition to damages by way of compensation to have allowed by you in your verdict such sum as punitive or exemplary
damages as in your opinion is proper, not only to punish it for continuing the nuisance if it has done so, but also to compel it to abate it if it has not already been
abated.
Id at 202.

tie precedential value in light of the contrary supreme court decision
in Hermits of St. Augustine expressly prohibiting an award of punitive damages against a municipal corporation. While both decisions
were by nisi prius courts, 2 0 the Hermits of St. Augustine opinion is
entitled to greater weight since it was a decision of the supreme
court. 2 '
2. The Spencer and Armstrong Cases.- Abstentionfrom the LegalIssue.-Two Pennsylvania appellate court decisions faced the legal issue of a municipality's liability for punitive damages, but
neither addressed the question because the requisite elements for a
punitive damage award were not present in the factual situations of
these cases.122 Since these courts could not impose punitive damages
under the particular facts presented, it was unnecessary to decide
whether these damages were permissible in theory against a municipal corporation.
In the first case, Spencer v. Carlisle Borough,123 an action was
brought against the borough to recover damages to land resulting
from laying a sewer in a portion of an alley owned by the plaintiff.
A jury awarded the plaintiff two hundred dollars. The superior
court reversed, holding that the evidence presented was insufficient
to sustain the damages awarded by the trial court. In considering
whether the verdict could be upheld as a punitive damage award, the
court stated that punitive damages could be awarded only if the borough had "wilfully, maliciously or wantonly disregarded the rights
of the complaining party."' 2 4 The court, however, concluded that
the action on the part
of the borough did not warrant an award of
125
punitive damages.

In Armstrong & Latta v. City of Philadelphia,126 the plaintiffs
sued the city in replevin for some equipment owned by plaintiffs and
retained by city officers, who believed that it belonged to another
contractor. In discussing the measure of damages, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania stated,
Exemplary damages may be allowed in cases where there have
been particular circumstances of fraud, oppression, or wrong in
the taking or detention of property. There being no evidence in
this case to support a claim for such damages the only question is
as to the proper measure to compensate plaintiffs....127
120.
121.
ough, 31
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 112-17 and accompanying text supra. See also Santucci v.Windber BorSom. 281, 284 (Pa.C.P. 1975).
See notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
63 Pa. Super. Ct. 513 (1916).
Id at 516.
Id
249 Pa. 39, 94 A. 455 (1915). The Armstrong case isdiscussed in Note, 22 WASH. &

LEE L. REV. 126, supra note 77, at 131.
127. 249 Pa. at 45, 94 A. at 457 (citation omitted).

This is the only reference to punitive damages in the decision. The
remainder of the opinion examines the measurement of compensatory damages. Since neither the Armstrong nor Spencer cases address the question of whether a defendant's status as a public
corporation should bar a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages,
neither can be treated as precedent on the issue of municipal liability
for punitive damages' 2 8 and, therefore, do not diminish the authority
of Hermits of St. Augustine.'29
C

Federal Court Decisions in Pennsylvania

New Castle Products,Inc. v. School District of Blair Township 13 °
was an action brought in federal district court in which plaintiff
sought compensatory and punitive damages for conversion. The
materials converted were valued at approximately $2,000, and the
balance of plaintiffs claim for $3,500 was based on punitive damages. The district court held that a municipal corporation could not
be liable for punitive damages except under express statutory authority and dismissed the case for lack of the $3,000 jurisdictional
amount. 131
New Castle Products was decided prior to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 132 which
held that in diversity cases a district court must apply the law that a
state court in the forum state would have applied had the case been
tried there. Prior to Erie, the federal district courts were free to ignore the state rules, and could fashion a general federal common
law. The court in New CastleProductswas fashioning such common
law when it stated:
128. The Armstrong and Spencer cases, therefore, should not be interpreted as implicitly
permitting a punitive damage award against a municipal corporation as has been suggested by
some authorities. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 683 (E.D. Pa.
1967), a9'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,395 U.S. 904 (1969); New Castle Prod.,
Inc. v. School Dist. of Blair Township, 18 F. Supp. 335, 336 (W.D. Pa. 1936); Note, 22 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 126, supra note 77, at 130-31. See also note 77 and accompanying text supra.
129. Two courts have called the language in the Armstrong, Spencer, and Howell cases on
the subject of punitive damages "dicta." New Castle Prod., Inc. v. School Dist. of Blair Township, 18 F. Supp. 335, 336 (W.D. Pa. 1936); Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281, 284
(Pa. C.P. 1975). It seems clear, however, that the language in these cases cannot be considered
dicta. See Commonwealth v. Almeidia, 362 Pa. 596, 603, 68 A.2d 595, 599 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 924 (1950) (quoting New York Cent. & H. R.R. Co. v. Price, 159 F. 330, 332 (1st Cir.
1908)) (" 'Whenever a question fairly arises in the course of a trial, and there is a distinct
decision of that question, the court's ruling in respect thereto can, in no just sense, be called
mere dictum' "). See also Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1963)
(when matter is before the court, argued before the court, and passed upon by the court, the
language in the opinion in respect thereto is not dicta); Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Swing,
409 Pa. 241, 186 A.2d 24 (1962) (adjudication of issue squarely raised in proceedings both in
lower court and in supreme court was not dicta when issue was plainly an intricate embodiment of supreme court's determination).
130. 18 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
131. Id at 337. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
132. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

The question of the liability of a municipal corporation, or a quasi
municipal corporation, for punitive damages has not been passed
upon by the appellate courts of Pennsylvania. There is dicta indicating such liability by municipal corporations. Armstrong &
Latta v. City of Philadelphia,. . . Spencer v. CarlisleBorough,.
Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of Philadelphia,. . . Howell v.

Borough of West Chester ....
The great weight of authority outside of Pennsylvania is to
the effect that municipal corporations are not liable 3 3for punitive
damages. . . . I am in accord with the [latter] rule.'
As the above passage indicates, the New Castle opinion cited
Hermits of St. Augustine for exactly the opposite principle for which
it stands. 134 That case prohibited, rather than permitted, a punitive
damage award against a municipal corporation. The court in New
Castle Products pointed out that the great weight of authority
outside of Pennsylvania prohibits punitive damages against municipal corporations. The district court based its holding upon the belief
that the better reasoning supports that position. The author of the
New Castle opinion, however, had firm support in Pennsylvania law
35
had he read the Hermits of St. Augustine decision properly.
Another federal district court decision, Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 136 involved a wrongful death action against the City of
Philadelphia and an oil company for the death of workmen killed in
a sewer explosion. The jury found that the city was negligent for
allowing gaseous vapors to accumulate in the sewer, and that this
negligence was a proximate cause of the explosion. 37 Moreover, the
jury found that the negligence of the city amounted to such a degree
of reckless disregard for the safety of others that an award of punitive damages were warranted. 38 Accordingly, punitive damages of
39
$75,000 were awarded against the city.'
The district court, considering the question on a motion for a
new trial, held that Pennsylvania law permitted a recovery of punitive damages against the City of Philadelphia. '4 0 The opinion stated
that the New Castle decision was not controlling because it was rendered before Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins. Quoting from the New
Castle case, the court stated that Pennsylvania case law permits punitive damages against a municipality. The Hennigan court, mistakenly relying on the New Castle court's erroneous interpretation of
Pennsylvania decisional law, incorrectly cited Hermits of St. Augus133. 18 F. Supp. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
134. See Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281, 286 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
135. Id at 287.
136. 282 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aft'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969).
137. Id at 677-78.
138. Id at 682.
139. Id at 689.
140. Id at 683.

tine as supporting the proposition that punitive damages could be
awarded against a municipal corporation.'' The court in Hennigan,
therefore, erred in not correctly applying the Hermits of St. Augus42
tine decision to the punitive damage issue under consideration. 1
In Hennigan, the court also held that the general common-law
rule that punitive damages may not be awarded against a municipal
corporation was modified or changed by the City of Philadelphia's
ordinance that waived any immunity from tort liability of the city. 141
This ordinance provides that injured persons "shall have the right to
bring suit against the City in accordance with the same rules of law as
applied by the Courts of this Commonwealth against any otherparty
defendant."44 This interpretation of the ordinance ignores numerous decisions that have held that the language of an ordinance relied
upon for the award of punitive damages must clearly express the
intent to permit such damages, and that ambiguous language or language capable of other construction will not suffice for this purpose.' 45 The city ordinance in question does not clearly and
unambiguously express this intention. Moreover, the language of
the ordinance is capable of other construction. 46 The better inter141. Id
142. Under the Erie doctrine, the Hennigan court was obligated to follow the Hermits of
St. Augustine decision even though the case was decided at nisi prius. Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940). But see King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank of Casper, 505 F.2d 1064
(10th Cir. 1974); Louthian v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973). See also
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 267-68 (1976).
143. 282 F. Supp. at 683.
144. The Philadelphia Code provides as follows:
§ 21-701 Acts of City Employees. (a) Any person sustaining bodily injury or death
caused by the negligence or unlawful conduct of any employee of the City, while the
employee is acting within the scope of his office or employment, shall have the right
to bring suit against the City in accordance with the same rules of law as applied by
the Courts of this Commonwealth against any other party defendant. In such suits
the City shall not plead governmental immunity as a defense.
PHILADELPHIA CODE ch. 21-700, § 21-701(a) (1962). This ordinance lost its original purpose
and necessity when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abolished governmental immunity in
1973. See notes 9-14 and accompanying text supra.
145. New Castle Prod., Inc. v. School Dist. of Blair Township, 18 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Pa.
1936); Michaud v. City of Bangor, 160 Me. 285, 203 A.2d 687 (1964); Desforge v. City of West
St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950); Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1,
321 N.E.2d 885 (1975); Longfellow v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 509, 136 P. 855 (1913). See
generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 903, 912 (1951).
146. See, e.g., Drain v.Kosydar, 54 Ohio St. 2d 49, 56, 374 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (1978), in
which the court interpreted the following statute as not permitting a punitive damage award
against the State of Ohio: "The state hereby waives ... its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined ...in accordance with the same rules oflaw

applicable to suits between private parties

. . .." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2743.02(A)

(Baldwin 1978) (emphasis added). See also Nephew v. State, 178 Misc. 824, 826, 36 N.Y.S.2d
541, 543 (Ct. Cl. 1942) in which the court interpreted the following statute as not allowing a
punitive damage award against the State of New York: "The state hereby waives its immunity
from liability ...and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules
oflaw as appliedto actions in the supreme court againstindividualsor corporations..

" N.Y.

CT. CL. ACT (29A) § 8 (McKinney 1963) (emphasis added). Cf Delong v. City of Denver, Colo. _, 576 P.2d 537 (1978) (the Denver city charter contains no monetary limitation on

pretation of this ordinance, therefore, is that it does not permit punitive damages against the city. '47
D. Santucci v. Wrindber Borough.- Correct Interpretationof
Pennsylvania Law
The only post-Hennigan case to consider liability of Pennsylvania municipalities for punitive damages has examined the Hennigan decision and has concluded that the federal court erred in its
interpretation of Pennsylvania law.'14 Santucci v. Windber Borough 14 9 was an action against the borough for nonfeasance on the
part of the borough police. The case came before the court on preliminary objections to the punitive damage request in the plaintiff's
complaint. Citing Order of Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of
Philadelphia50 as precedent, the court held that in Pennsylvania a
municipal corporation cannot be held liable for punitive damages. ' 5'
Judge Shaulis, who wrote the opinion in the Santucci case, gave two
reasons why he refused to follow the decision in Hennigan. First, he
believed that Hennigan misinterpreted the Hermits of St. Augustine
case' 5 2 and erred in ignoring the great weight of authority outside of
Pennsylvania that holds that municipal corporations are not liable
for punitive damages. 153 Second, the judge noted that a federal
court's decision on state law is not binding on a state court: "Regardless of the federal courts [sic] position or its interpretation of
Pennsylvania Law, the state courts are the proper forum to declare
state law. The federal decisions may be persuasive but are not stare
decisis."' 54 The Santucci opinion is the most recent Pennsylvania
state court decision on municipal liability for punitive damages and
is a correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on this issue. 55 Its
holding and rationale should be followed by Pennsylvania courts
damages and makes Denver liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
employer under like circumstances).
147. The Hennigan court's claim that the city was liable for punitive damages because it
was engaged in a proprietary, as distinguished from a governmental, function is irrelevant
today in light of the abolition of such a distinction in Pennsylvania. See Ayala v. Philadelphia
Bd. of Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). Nonetheless, this device of applying the proproprietary-governmental distinction to the issue of a municipality's liability for punitive damApp. 3d 692,
ages has been criticized and rejected in George v. Chicago Transit Auth., 58 I11.
374 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1978).
148. Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 281, 283-88 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
149. Id
150. See notes 110-17 and accompanying text supra.
151. 31 Som. at 289.
152. Id at 286. See notes 136-42 and accompanying text supra.
153. 31 Som. at 288. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
154. 31 Som. at 287.
155. The Santucci court, however, was not correct in assuming that the Hermits of St.
Augustine case was a decision of the supreme court sitting as an appellate court. See id at 285
and note 111 and accompanying text supra.

when confronted with this issue in the future.' 5 6
E. The PoliticalSubdivision Tort Claims Act
On November 26, 1978, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted
the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act,' 5 7 which provides a comprehensive procedure for presenting tort claims against political subdivisions in Pennsylvania and substantially limits the tort liability of
these entities.' 5 8 The Act applies only to causes of action that arose
after January 25, 1979, the effective date of the Act.' 5 9 The Act,
therefore, has no bearing on a municipality's liability for punitive
damages resulting from causes of action that arose prior to that date.
Under the new Act, a municipality's liability may only arise
when a municipal employee's negligent acts or omissions occur
within the scope of his office or duties, 16 1 and even then only in cases
falling within one of eight general categories. 16 ' These eight categories relate primarily to the operation of motor vehicles and the condition, operation, and maintenance of real estate, buildings, and
1 62
other municipal facilities in the control of the local government.
The Act also insulates a municipality from liability for the willful or
malicious conduct of one of its employees. 163 Thus, it would seem
that a municipality could not be liable for punitive damages. Pennsylvania, however, has adopted Section 908 of the Restatement of
Torts,"6 which states that punitive damages are "awarded against a
156. The plaintiff in Santucci argued that the abolition of governmental immunity in
Pennsylvania also took away a municipality's immunity from punitive damages. The court
properly rejected this argument, stating that it "misses the point," as the "punitive damages
issue is completely separate from the issue of immunity. The punitive damages doctrine does
not violate the municipal liability doctrine, it merely defines for reasons of public policy the
degree to which the municipality will be held responsible." 31 Som. at 288. Cf George v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 58 111. App. 3d 692, _,374 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1978) (the abrogation of the
doctrine of governmental immunity does not abolish a municipality's immunity from punitive
damages).
157. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.101 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See notes 15-17 and
accompanying text supra.
158. Section 402 of the Act provides the following: "Damages arising from the same cause
of action or transaction or occurrence or series of causes of action or transactions or occurrences shall not exceed $500,000 in the aggregate." 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.402 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). This section, however, may violate the Pennsylvania Constitution, which
provides in pertinent part: "[In no... cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to
be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property ...." PA.
CONST. art. 3, § 18. See Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 408-13, 346 A.2d 897, 907-10 (1975)
(Eagen, J.,dissenting).
159. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.803 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
160. Id. § 5311.202(a)(2).
161. See id. § 5311.202(b).
162. Id The classifications in the Act that establish when a person may or may not sue a
political subdivision may violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
See Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 414-15, 346 A.2d 897, 910-11 (1975) (O'Brien, J.,
dissenting).
163. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 531 1.202(a)(2), 5311.307 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
164. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.

person to punish him for his outrageous conduct."' 65 In Pennsylvania, therefore, malicious or willful conduct is not a necessary
prerequisite to an award of punitive damages--outrageous conduct
will suffice. Thus, the provision of the new Act that immunizes a
municipality from liability for the malicious or wilful acts of its employees does not in and of itself prohibit an award of punitive damages against a municipal corporation.
The most important part of the Act pertaining to the punitive
damage issue is Chapter Four. 166 Section 403167 of this chapter lists
the types of losses recognized under the Act. One commentator has
written that because the list in Section 403 is stated to be exclusive,
and because the Act does not mention punitive damages, the Act
prohibits a punitive damage award against a municipality. 68 This
analysis, however, does not take into consideration that Section 403
is entitled "Types of losses recognized." A credible interpretation of
Section 403 is that by intentionally using this specific title, 6 9 the leg165. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1939) (emphasis added).
166. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.401 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
167. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.403 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), which provides as follows:
Section 403. Types of losses recognized
Damages shall be recoverable only for:
(I) Past or future loss of earnings and earning capacity.
(2) Pain and suffering in the following instances:
(i) death; or
(ii) only in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or permanent dismemberment where the medical and dental expenses referred
to in paragraph (3) are in excess of $1,500. (3) Medical and dental expenses including
the reasonable value of reasonable and necessary medical and dental services, prosthetic devices and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, and physical
therapy expenses accrued and anticipated in the diagnosis, care and recovery of the
claimant.
(4) Loss of consortium.
(5) Loss of support.
(6) Property losses.
(emphasis added).
168. Aman, Practicing Under the New Pennsylvania Municipal Tort Claims Act, 50 PA.
B.A.Q. 122, 126 (1979).
169. See Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1924 (Purdon
Supp. 1979-80) (although not controlling, section headings may be used to aid in the construction of statutes). Accord, Starr & Sons, Inc. v. Stepp, 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 15, 211 A.2d 78 (1965);
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.14, at 93-97 (4th ed. C.

Sands 1973). The Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110 (Purdon Supp.
1979), which establishes a procedure for bringing tort claims against the Commonwealth, has a
similar provision limiting the types of damages recoverable against the Commonwealth. Sec-

tion 5111(b) of that Act provides the following:
(b) Types ofdamages recoverable. - Damages shall be recoverable only for:
(1) Past and future loss of earnings and earning capacity.
(2) Pain and suffering.
(3) Medical and dental expenses including the reasonable value of reasonable
and necessary medical and dental services, prosthetic devices and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, and physical therapy expenses accrued and an-

ticipated in the diagnosis, care and recovery of the claimant.
(4) Loss of consortium.
(5) Property losses, except property losses shall not be recoverable in claims
brought pursuant to section 51 10(a)(5).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5111 (b) (Purdon Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). This section does

islature intended this section to place limitations only on compensatory damages. A court, therefore, could reasonably interpret Section
403 as having no bearing on the issue of punitive damages and hold
that because the Act does not mention exemplary damages they may
be recovered from a municipal corporation.
Earlier versions of the Act, however, seem to indicate that it was
the intent of the legislature to prohibit a punitive damage award
against a political subdivision. One draft of the Act, which unanimously passed the Pennsylvania Senate, 7 ° contained the following
provision: "No award for damages shall include punitive or exemplary damages ..... "'1 The House of Representatives also passed
an amended version of the Senate bill with an identical provision
prohibiting punitive damages.' 72 This amended bill was sent to a
conference committee, which completely redrafted the bill'7 3 and, in
the process, omitted the provision prohibiting an award of exemplary damages.
While the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act does not clearly
prohibit a recovery of punitive damages from a municipal corporation, neither does it explicitly authorize the granting of such an
award. 174 Because of this ambiguity in the Act, courts will have to
look exclusively to the case law to resolve whether a Pennsylvania
municipality may be liable for punitive damages.
VII.

Conclusion

In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable from a municipal corporation
unless expressly authorized by statute. Sound reasons of public policy support this general rule. The punitive and deterrent purposes of
punitive damages are not fulfilled when permitted against a municipality because they would be borne by the taxpayers, who are guilty
of no wrongdoing and are in no position to exert direct control to
prevent future misconduct. The only effect of a punitive damage
award against a municipality is to allow a windfall for plaintiffs.
not have the heading "Types of losses recognized," which is found in § 403 of the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.403 (Purdon Supp., 1979-80).
Because § 511 l(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act does not use this heading, and since the
section is stated to be exclusive and the Act does not mention punitive damages, this section
should be interpreted as forbidding a recovery of punitive damages from the Commonwealth.
See JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 20 (1978) (recommended that the General Assembly enact a bill that insulates the Commonwealth from punitive damage liability).
170. See Aman, supra note 168, at 123.
171. S. 1477, 1978 Sess., § 103, Printer's No. 2010.
172. S. 1477, 1978 Sess., § 103, Printer's No. 2163. See Aman, supra note 168, at 123.
173. See Aman, supra note 168, at 123.
174. See Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 6, 321 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1975)
(language of a statute relied upon for the award of punitive damages against a municipality
must clearly express the intent to permit such damages).

The best method to deter municipal employee wrongdoing is to have
the punitive damage award assessed only against the guilty employee, based on his own financial resources.' 75 This would be the
most effective way to punish and deter malicious conduct of municipal employees.
The Pennsylvania legislature should amend its Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act by adding a provision that explicitly prohib176
its a punitive damage award against a municipal corporation.
Until such an amendment is enacted, however, Pennsylvania courts
should follow the majority rule that prohibits punitive damage
awards against a municipal corporation.
THOMAS

J.

RUETER

175. Municipal employees can be liable for punitive damages in their individual capacities. Euge v. Trantina, 422 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1970); Wrains v. Rose, 175 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist.
172 So.
Ct. App. 1965); Fisher v. City of Miami, 160 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), a
2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Nelson v. Halvorson, 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912); Board of
Comm'rs of Rogers County v. Baxter, 113 Okla. 280, 241 P. 752 (1925). Cf Hutchins v. City of
Hialeah, 196 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1967) (recovery against city for assault and battery by employee
of city cannot exceed recovery against its employee); Chupp v. Henderson, 134 Ga. App. 808,
216 S.E.2d 366 (1975) (if several defendants are sued jointly, exemplary damages are not recoverable against any of them unless all are liable therefor). See also Section 301 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, which provides as follows: "An employee of a political
subdivision is liable for civil damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused
... 53
by his acts or omissions only to the same extent as his emfployingpoliticalsubdivision.
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.301 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (emphasis added). Thus, according
to § 301, if a court construes the Act as prohibiting an exemplary damage award against political subdivisions, it must hold that municipal employees are also insulated from punitive damage liability.
176. Many states have laws that explicitly prohibit recovery of punitive damages against a
municipal corporation. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818 (West 1966); 2 IDAHO CODE § 6-918
(1978 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-102 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-416.5-4 (Burns Supp. 1979). Cf. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1971)
(prohibits award of punitive damages against federal government); ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.280
(1973) (prohibits punitive damages against state); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-621(h) (West Supp.
1979-80) (forbids exemplary damage award against state).

